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Abstract 
This study aims at understanding determinants of vertical coordination for firms in developing economies by 
conducting exploratory study in Tanzania. The study is centred on business - to business buyer -seller relations. 
Primary data were collected from buying side of the relationship. The main supplier of each firm was identified 
and used for answering the questionnaire.Findings suggest contractual flexibility to have higher significant 
positive effect in determining vertical coordination. The interaction effect between buyer asset specificity and 
contractual flexibility was also significant, while asset specificity by itself was not found to be significant. These 
prelimenary findings suggest the strength of vertical coordination relies to extent onwhether parties in 
relationship agree to be flexible in their contracts.  
Keywords: Vertical coordination, Asset specificity contractual flexibility, Environmental uncertainty 
1. Introduction 
A focus behind Transaction Cost Theory (TCA) is the assignment of specific governance mode on the basis of 
low (economical) transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). TCA perspective arguesthat the “inter-firm exchanges 
vulnerable with unforseen contingecies can not be governed with complete contract” (Buvik & Grønhaug, 2000, 
p.447). Vertical coordination is among the intermediate/relational forms of governance (Stern & Reve, 1980; 
Buvik & Andersen, 2002). Core dimension of Transaction cost theory (TCA) are asset specificity and 
uncertainty surrounding the exchange (Andersen & Buvik, 2002). According to Williamson (1985, 1991) the 
escalation of specific assets will call for vertical coordination as a mechanism for controlling the ex post 
transaction costs. There are mixed results on effect of environmental uncertainty on vertical coordination. Some 
studies have found negative relationship (Levy, 1985; John & Weitz, 1988; Masten, 1984) while others found no 
relationship (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984; Maltz, 1994). TCA has been critisized before for lack of 
generalizability and having ethnocentric bias (Dore, 1983). A need for flexibility arises because of bounded 
rationality limits of a human mind to focus on given information (Macneil, 1980). Rindefeisch and Heide (1997) 
argued that bilateral hybrid governance structures appear to provide a firm with a way to safeguard its specific 
assets by developing closer ties with its exchange partners. This study has assumed the vertical coordination to 
be contingent upon partners’ readness to excersise contractual flexibility. Wilingness to show contractual 
flexibility is a sign of trust and it will improve the vertical coordination upon low to medium asset specificity 
deployment in the relationship between buyer and seller. This study is one of few attempts that examine the way 
asset specificity interacts with contractual flexibility in determining vertical coordination.   
2. Statement of the problem 
There are very few studies in developing countriesthat relate most of busines theories emerged from developed 
economies. There is a general assumption that existing findings do directly apply for firms in developing 
economies. Transaction cost theory has been developed around firms in developed economies and mostly in 
large manufacturing (supplier-manufacturer relations). Typical characteristics of firms in developing economies 
include small size and small manufacturing. Culture and institutions surrounding firms in developing 
economiesare different from developed economies. This difference shapes the way firms respond and organize 
their activities. The effect of context on TCA theory is assumed to be minimal in developing economies. This 
study provides a different platform through bringing in a developigng economy context to understand 
determinants of vertical coordination from TCA perspective. Current literature suggests vertical coordination to 
be driven by asset specificity. In attempt to safeguard these specific investments, firms cannot totally rely on the 
use of formal contracts andso they use vertical coordination instead. This might not always be a condition for 
firms in developing economies. Presence of vertical coordination could be derived by other contingencies 
surrounding of partners. This study is important in a sense that it enhance our understanding on how vertical 
coordination decisions play in developing economies.  
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3. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
3.1 Vertical Coordination 
Vertical coordination is one of the intermediate (hybrid/relational) modes of governance. It can be viewed as a 
purposive organization of activities and information flows between firms (Stern& Reve, 1980; John & Reve, 
1982; Buvik & John, 2002).Vertical coordination has been associated with reduction of ex post transaction costs 
such as product design and production (Dowst, 1988; Spekman, 1988). The strength of vertical coordination is 
attributed by first; having interaction pattern that is beyond contracts and second; havinginteraction pattens that 
are private rather than legal mandate (Buvik &John 2000). For a “vertical coordination to be beneficial, the ex 
post transaction costs has to decline with greater vertical coordination, and vice versa” (Buvik & John 2000). 
Vertical coordiation is seen to be important in “handling ex post issues” that arises when firms make transactions 
(Buvik & Andersen, 2002). Studies has supported the idea of better adaptation as a result of relational 
interactions among firms (Heide & John, 1990; Lusch & Brown’s, 1996) 
3.2 Effects on Vertical Coordination 
3.2.1 Conceptual Model  
The model in Figure1 gives a summary of the hypotheses that are rised. It consists of three hypotheses. 
Hypothesis1 predicts of direct positive relationship between contractual flexibility and vertical coordination. 
Hypotheis2 predicts the direct positive effect of asset specificity on vertical coordination and hypothesis3 
predicts the positive interaction effect of asset specificity and contractual flexibility on vertical coordination. 
INSERT FIGURE1 
3.2.2 Direct effect of contractual flexibility 
From supplier’s perspective, contractual flexibility represents assurance that the relationship will be subject to 
good-faith modification if a particular practice proves detrimental in the light of changed circumstances (Heide 
& John, 1992). Contracts are“incomplete” and we can hardly rely on them to solve our problems (Anderlini & 
Felli, 1999). A need for flexibility arises because of “bounded rationality i.e. the limits of a human mind to focus 
on available information” (Macneil, 1980). Flexibility defines a “bilateral expectation of willingness to make 
adaptations as circumstances change” (Heide & John 1992:35). “It is not the degree to which agreements have 
been tightly worded ex ante that is of concern, rather it is the reaction toward change requests that matters” 
(Noordewier et al 1990: 83). Flexibility is a sign of trust and confidence among trading partners. The assumption 
is that flexibility might be an opening door towards vertical coordination. The other side of argument is that 
flexibility is important ingredient for cooperation. When it exists for sometimes it will transform the relationship 
between supplier and buyer in a very positive level. This assumption leads to the hypothesis that contractual 
flexibility will have a significant positive impact on vertical coordination.  
H1: Contractual flexibility has a positive impact on vertical coordination 
3.2.3 Buyer Asset specificity 
Asset specificity has been seen as a key motive for vertical coordination (Bucklin &Sengupta, 1993; 
Rindefleisch & Heide, 1997, Geyskens et al, 2006). Empirical works have previously linked asset specificity 
with vertical coordination (Buvik & Reve, 2002; Heide & John, 1990). Asset specificity is defined as the 
“durable investments that are undertaken in support of a particular transaction” (Williamson, 1985). They 
include“pysical and immaterial assets tailored to a specific relationship that cannot be redeployed for other 
purposes without the sacrifice of productive value” (Buvik & Andersen, 2002). The prediction of transaction cost 
theory is that low asset specificity is associated with market form of governance. Market as a form of governance 
provides self control against opportunistic behaviour. Increased power of the buyer in the market mode, positions 
the seller in threat of loosing customers and reputation if he behaves opportunistically. TCA predicts the 
escalation of asset specificity to lead to vertical coordination as a mechanism to handle hazards that are brought 
by small number conditions (Williamson, 1991, Williamson, 1985). The study assumes this relation will be 
maintained independent of the context and formally we hypothesize that: 
H2: Buyer asset specificity has a positive effect on vertical coordination 
3.2.4 Interaction effect of contractual flexibility and asset specificity 
Rindefleisch and Heide (1997) argued that bilateral hybrid governance structures appear to provide a firm with a 
way to safeguard its specific assets by developing closer ties with its exchange partners. Bucklin and Sengupta 
(1993), found that under conditions of high levels of specific “investments, co-marketing alliance partners 
reduce power imbalances through formal contracts that build exit barriers, exclusive dealing, and financial 
incentives into the relationship”. The problem tha arises with strict contractual agreements is the the inflexibility. 
For closer ties to grow, partner has to assume a reasonable level of flexibility.The exercise of vertical 
coordination is therefore contingent upon partners’ willingness to excersise contractual flexbility. In consistent 
with Rindefleisch (1997), we expect under the presence of both asset specificity and contractual flexibility the 
effect of vertical coordination will be positive.   
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H3: The asset specificity will have positive impact on vertical coordination in the presence of contractual 
flexibility. 
3.3 Control Variables 
3.3.1 Environmental uncertainty 
Environmental uncertainty is a reflected by instability in volume or technical (Geyskens et al, 2006). 
Environmental uncertainty (volume and technical) increases the likelihood of choosing market governance over 
relational governance (Geyskens et al, 2006). In search to reduce uncertainty, not only will hierarchies create a 
low discretion, high-compliance environment inside the organization, they will also choose external environment 
that will represent relatively low levels of volatility in technologies and market characteristics (Eisenhardt, 1985). 
Williamson (1991) argued hybrid to be vulnerable with prencence of external uncertainty. Some studies reported 
positive relationship between environmental uncertainty and vertical coordination (Levy, 1985; John & Weitz, 
1988; Masten, 1984), while others have reportednegative association (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984; Maltz, 
1994). We predict environmental uncertainty to lower the chances for both contractual flexibility and asset 
specificity in predicting vertical coordination. 
3.3.2 Reciprocal investment by supplier 
Anderson and Weitz (1992) have pointed out that one party in a relation can make specific investment that will 
serve as hostage to safegurd the other party’s investment. We also expect the reciprocal investment by the 
supplier to increase the likelhood of both contractual flexibility and asset specificity in predicting vertical 
coordination. 
3.3.3 Peformance ambiguity 
Performance ambiguity is related to expost information asymmetry which could be a potential source for 
opportunism (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1979). Handling expost problems are associated with the 
idea behind vertical coordination (Buvik & Andersen, 2002). Difficulties associats with measuring performance 
will incourage cooperation among partners.When neither behaviour nor outcome of behaviours can be measured 
effectively, the social controsl become perfarable (Ouchi, 1980). Hence we expect performance ambiguity to 
have a positive impact on both contractual flexibility and asset specificity in predicting vertical coordination.  
4. Methodology 
4.1 Research Background 
The empirical context for the study is Tanzanian producer and distributor firms, representing suppliers and 
buyers respectively. Data were collected from distributor (buyer) firms. A random sample of n=150 buyers were 
contacted by phone call, of which n=130 were interested to participate. The questionnaires were distributed 
personally. This allowed for explanations or clarification to respondents. Buying firm was told to identify a 
major supplier who was being used to respond to the questionnaire. Questionnaires were later collected and the 
response rate was about 65%.  
4.2 Sample characteristics 
25.8% of firms involved in this study were established between years 1990-2000, 73.2% were those which had 
been established after year 2000. The rest were established before year 1990. Business turnover indicated that 
30.9% of firms had an annual turnover of up to 5 million Tanzanian shillings, 55.7% with annual turnover of 
between 5 to 200 million Tanzanian shillings (exclusive), 12.4 had annual turnover of between 200 to 800 
million Tanzania shillings (exclusive), and the rest had above 800 million Tanzania shillings. 25.8% of firms 
purchased from their supplier an amount of less than 10% of their total purchases, 33% with between 10-40 
exclusively, 23.7% with between 40-70% exclusively and the rest were above 70% . 
4.3 Measurements 
4.3.1 Vertical coordination 
Multi iterm scales have mainly been used to measure vertical coordination (Heide &John, 1990). These studies 
have indicated high reliability of these scales. This study used three items (in table1) in measuring this concept. 
After factor analysis the three items loaded into a single factor. The reliability analysis indicated α = 81.59% 
which was quite significant. The results were also confirmed by Kaizer-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett’s test 
which measured 0.717 and λ2 = 97.153 (significant at p < .001), respectively signifying a very strong correlation 
of items measuring this concept. 
4.3.2 Contractual flexibility (CFLEX) 
A 7-points likert scale consisting of multi iterms indicating the degree of acceptance has been widely used in 
measuring this concept (Heide & John, 1992; Heide 1994). The focus on mesuring this construct has been on 
parties' expected flexibility in response to changing circumstances (Heide, 1994). This study adopted the same 
scale (7-points likert scale) with multi iterms scale indicating the extent to which respondents rank the accuracy 
of discription (completely inaccurate/completely accurate description). Three items (table1) were used and all of 
them loaded in a single component after performing a factor analysis. The reliability analysis measured a level of 
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α = 78.92% which was significant. KMO and Bartlett’s test indicated a measure of 0.623 and λ2 = 98.234 
(significant at p < .001) respectively. In the analysis this factor was abbreviated by CFLEX 
4.3.3 Buyer asset specificity (BUASP) 
This concept has been measured using five item, seven-point scale, anchored by "strongly disagree" and“strongly 
agree" statements (Rokklan et al, 2003; Stump & Heide, 1996).While Anderson (1985) used 7 items, this study 
used four items (table1) on 7-points likert scale with completely inaccurate/accurate description. After 
performing factor analysis all loaded into one component using principal component factor analysis method. The 
reliability of this component measured α = 93.35% which is very significant. KMO was 0.796 also indicated a 
satisfactory correlation level of the items which justified for factor analysis. Bartlett’s test indicated λ2= 501.17, 
significant at (p < .001), rejecting the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix was identity matrix. The buyer 
asset specificity was abbreviated by term BUASP in the analysis. 
4.3.4 Performance ambiguity (PA) 
Some studies have tried to capture concept of performance ambiguity separately without being integrated inside 
behavioural uncertainty measures. For example four to six iterms in seven-point scalehave previouly been used 
before in measuring this construct (Stump & Heide, 1996; Ghosh & John, 2005). Some studies have integrated 
this concept in the behavioral as well as environmental uncertainty (Anderson, 1985). This study adopted these 
measures using four items, 7- point likert scale (table1). All items loaded into one component with reliability 
coefficient α = 70%. KMO and Bartlett’s test measured at 0.771 and λ2 = 65.647 (significant at p < .001) 
respectively implying a very significant correlation of these iterms in measuring the concept. This concept was 
abbreviated by PA in the analysis.  
4.3.5 Environmental uncertainty (ENVU) 
Multi items scales have mostly been used in many studies for this variable (Noordiwier et al, 1990; Anderson, 
1985). The items used in these studies  reflect instability (complex, volatile, difficult to monitor, uncertain 
markets, high forecast error) and other items reflect venturing into the unknown as the firm’s emphasis on new 
activities (Anderson, 1985), or volume and technological uncertainties (Noordiwier et al, 1990). The study used 
three items (all shown in table1) in measuring this concept. After factor analysis all iterms loaded into a single 
factor. Further the reliability analysis indicated α = 82.78% which is quite significant. KMO and Bartlett’s test 
measured 0.859 and λ2 = 417.069 (significant at p < .001) respectively, implying a significant correlation of the 
terms in measuring the concept. This concept in the analysis was then be abbreviated as ENVU. 
4.3.6 Supplier asset specificity (SUASP) 
Multi iterm scale has been used to measure this concept (Heide & John, 1992; Buvik, 2000). The 7-points likert 
scale of 4 items (table1) was used in measuring this concept. Minor adjustments were implemented so as to suit 
with the new study setting. After factor analysis method the results from varimax rotation indicated that two 
items loaded in single component. The reliability coefficient for the variables in the component measured α = 
95.91%, which was quite significant. Other measures were used for factor analysis justification like KMO, which 
measured at 0.813, indicating correlation among items were significant. Bartlett’s test as well measured at λ2= 
573.517 which was significant at p < .001, rejecting the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix was identity 
matrix. Supplier asset specificity was abbreviated by term SUASP in the analysis.  
INSERT TABEL1 
5. Results 
H1 suggested a postive impact of contractual flexibility on vertical coordination. This hypothesis was supported 
from table2 results in Model 1 (t= .813, p < .01). The strength of this effect remained consistent after introducing 
different control. Model 4 in table 2 used all controls and the robustness was maintained (t=.783, p < .01). 
Correlation matrix from table3 does not indicate any serious effect of mutlicollinearity.This improved validity of 
variable’s prediction.  
H2 suggested buyer asset specificity to have a positive impact on vertical coordination. This hypothesis was not 
supported. All Models from table 2 have not indicated any significant effect inspite of adding different controls.  
H3 suggests buyer asset specificity to have higher positive effect in prescence of contractual flexibility. This 
hypothesis was supported and the effect remained consistent after introducing controls. The Interaction effect 
between buyer asset specificity and contractual flexibility on vertical coordination with absence of controls in 
table 2, Model 1 (t=.582, p<.01) was significant. This effect remained significant after introducing all controls 
inModel 4 (t=2.4, P<.01) in table2. The correlation matrix in table3 indicated vertical coordination to 
significantly and positively correlate with contractual flexibility and performance ambiguity. These correlations 
do not indicate any serious problem of multicollinearity. On the other hand asset specificity did not indicate to 
have significant correlation with vertical coordination.  
General remarks imply little effect from controls on the suggested relations. Model 1 in table2 (R2Adj= .23; F (3, 
94) =10.41; p<.001) do not differ wih Mode 4 in table 2 (R2Adj= .235; F (7, 90) =5.17; p<.001). The increments 
in R2=.005, which is very small and thus suggest the three variables hypothesized were strong predictor of 
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The result from table 2 has supported the H1 and H3 while H2 was not suported.These findings indicate vertical 
coordination to be highly determined by willingness of partners to excersise contractual flexibility.Previous 
findings have suggested low to moderate asset specificity willhave positive impact on vertical coordination 
(Buvik & John, 2000; Rendefleisch & Heide, 1997), while others have found negative effect (Frank & 
Henderson, 1992). Ghoshal and Moran’s (1996) found asset specificity to have positive effect in markets but 
negative in hierarchies/hybrids, while Buvik and John (2000) has found asset specificity to have positive effect 
on vertical coordination. This study has found contractual flexibility to be key determinant of vertical 
coordination. This partly suggests contractual flexibility to be a lubricant through which better relations between 
seller and buyer can develop. Buyer asset specificity alone does not cause any significant impact. The sign of the 
effect is negative [constistent with previous findings from Ghoshal and Moran’s, (1996)] though not significant. 
The interaction between asset specificity and contractual flexibility was found to be significant as predicted. This 
suggests asset specificity to be contingent upon contractual flexibility among partners. Flexibility could be 
viewed as a sign of “willingness to make adaptations as circumstances change” (Heide & John 1992). From 
these findings we argue flexibility to be one of key determinants in defining the boundary between hierarchy and 
vertical coordination in presence of asset specificity.  
7. Limitations  
This study acts as exploratory and the scope is limited to firms in developing economies. The study had only 
included relations between local firms and did not extend to analyse relations between local and international 
firms. The sample size of the firms used was small which limits the explanatory power. The analysis of the 
results has not included variables like culture and institutional related factors. These variables could provide 
extensive explanation of these relationships. Differences in industrieswas not analysed and the findings might 
not apply to all industries. 
8. Conclusion and Implications 
The study suggests contractual flexibility to be a major determinant toward vertical coordination. Asset specificity 
itself was not found to be significant determinant though its interaction with contractual flexibility had a 
significant positive impact on vertical coordination. Our understanding on the influence of low to moderate asset 
specificity in determining vertical coordination has ignored other surrounding dimensions like parnters’ 
willingness to show flexibility. This study has updated us our understanding on the role of partners’ willingness to 
exercise contractual flexibility in determining vertical coordination.  
We do suggest other studies to examine how firms in developing economies interplay asset specificity and 
contractual flexibility and how does this differ between industries, firm size, culture and even experience.This 
study was limited by being conducted to firms in Tanzania and the generalizability should be considered premarily 
but not minor.  
9. Recommendations 
We do recommend other studies on this area to involve more contries and more industries. More variables like 
culture and other institutional related factors could be added and their role should be explained. Future studies 
should involve alternative theoretical approaches. For example network theories could be integrated in this 
subject to expand the explanation. Results should also take into account both industry and country specific 
factors. Extensive studies could try to explain why there are expected to be fundamental different or similarities 
in terms of theoretical implications between firms in developed and developing economies.  
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p < .01 
α = 81.59% 
KMO = .717 
1.We regularly exchange information on this product with this supplier 
2. We regularly exchange information about price development and market 
conditions with this supplier 
3. We cooperate closely with this supplier on quality control of product 
delivered to our firm. 
Contractual Flexibility (CFLEX) 
(3 Items) 
λ2 = 98.234 
p < .01 
α = 78.92% 
KMO = .623 
1 Flexibility in response to request for changes is a characteristic of this 
relationship 
2. The parties expect to be able to make adjustments in the ongoing relationship 
to cope with changing circumstances 
3. When some unexpected situation arises, the parties would rather work out a 
new deal than hold each other to  




p < .01 
α = 93.35% 
KMO = .796,  
1.We have made significant investment in equipment dedicated to our 
relationship with this supplier 
2. We have made extensive internal adjustments in order to deal effectively with 
this supplier 
3. Training our people to deal with this supplier has involved substantial 
commitments of time and money 
4. Our logistics system have been tailored to meet the requirements of dealing 
with this supplier  




p < .01 
α = 95.91 
KMO = 0.813 
1.Supplier has trained their employees to deal with our firm 
2.Supplier has made substantial commitment of time and money 
3.Supplier production systems have been tailored to produce for our firm. 
4. Supplier logistics system has been tailored to meet the requirements of 
dealing with our supplies. 
Performance ambiguity (PA) 
(4 Items) 
λ2 =65.647 
p < .01 
α = 70% 
KMO = .711 
1 It is inadequate to evaluate this supplier base on item(s) price. 
2. Evaluating the supplier’s performance is highly complex process 
3. There would be significant costs associated with one-site monitoring of this 
supplier. 
4. Precise standards to assess this supplier’s performance are not readily 
available. 
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Environmental Uncertainty (EU)
(3 Items)  
λ2 =417.069 
p < .01 
α = 82.78% 
KMO = 0.859 
1 Demand for this product varies continually.2. Our most important competitors 
are regularly carrying out product adjustment 
3. Product we are purchasing from this supplier have high innovation rate and 
varies continually. 
This table shows a list of all the variables used in the analysis. First column gives the details of each variable 
(reliability, KMO Bartlett’s test and significance level). Second column show a list of specific items used to 
indicate a given variable. 
Table 2. Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Vertical Coordination 
 MODEL 1 MODEL2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 
Independent 
variables 
b t b t b t b t 
CONST 5.467 .000 5.477 .000 5.472 47.8** 4.45 5.7** 
H1 BUASP -.207 -1.14 -.177 -.956 -.179 -.966 -.181 -.98 
H2 CFLEX .813 .582** .842 5.44** .845 5.43** .783 4.7** 
H3 BUASPXCFLEX .568 .582** .559 2.57** .553 2.53** .532 2.4** 
Control Variables         
SUASP   -.091 -.967 -.088 -.909 -.104 -1.07 
ENVU     -.111 -.808 -.138 -1.008 
PA       .194 1.318 
 R2 Adj = .23 
F (3, 94) = 10.41 
P <.001 
R2 Adj = .23 
F (4, 93) = 8.04 
P <.001 
R2 Adj = .22 
F (6, 91) = 5.5 
P<.001 
R2 Adj = .235 
F (7, 90) = 
5.17 
P<.001 
*Indicates p<.05 (One-tailed) 
**Indicates p<.01 (two-tailed) 
This table gives regression results for the three models use. Mode1 consist a list of three varibles used in 
hypotheses excluding controls. Model 2 used reciprocal investment from supplier as a contro. Model 3 used 
supplier reciprocal investment and environmental uncertainty as controls. Model4 use all controls. The results on 
each model’s fitness are presented under the table.   
Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. VERTCOORD 1 -.139 .435** -.057 -.041 -.080 .25* 
2. BUASP  1 -.131 .143 .065 -.019 -.042 
3. CFLEX   1 -.56** .189 .055 .381** 
4. BUASPXCFLEX    1 -.095 -.056 -.171 
5. SUASP     1 .062 .220* 
6. ENVU      1 .311** 
8.PA       1 
Means 5.56 -.389 .0605 -.0707 5.43 -.0220 5.210 
Standard 
deviation 
1.00 .503 .722 .506 .47 .9047 .7112 
* Indicates significance at p<.05 
** Indicates significance at p<.01 
This table presents a correlation matrix for all variables used in the analysis. Information about means and 




www.ccsenet.org/ijbm           International Journal of Business and Management         Vol. 6, No. 8; August 2011 










Figure 1. Conceptual model 
The model describes thre conceptual framework of this study. The three hypotheses are denoted as H1, H2 and 
H3. H1 suggests a direct positive impact of contractual flexibility on vertical coordination. H2 suggests a direct 
effect of of asset specificity on vertical coordination. H3 suggests positive interaction effect of asset specificity 
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